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iAbstract
Two experiments employing the Sensenig and Brehm .(1968) paradigm
assessed the effects of implied threats to behavioural freedom on the
arousal of psychological reactance The first experiment assessed
implied threat effects, and also the interactive effects of overt
threat in the form of variations on aspects of communication style.
The principal analysis failed to support the Sensenig and Brehm (1968)
notion that (a) there should be attitude change away from a threatening
communication, _and (b) that the magnitude of change should be a function
of the number of behavioural freedoms threatened by implication. A
moderate degree of attitude change away from the communication was ob-
served in all conditions, but the threat manipulations did not differen-
tiate among the magnitudes of change. A post hoc analysis showed High
Overt Threat Males to react to a greater degree than Low Overt Threat
~fules. This finding was attributed to differential perceptions of like-
lihood of future solicitations of opinion by the confederate, in that
Low Overt Threat Males were found to perceive a greater likelihood of
solicitation of opinion than High Overt Threat Males. This correlation
was consistent with the expectations of reactance theory. Implied
threat was also observed to affect subjects' perceptions of a confederate's
competence. Implied Threat Level Five subjects were observed to regard
the confederate as being less competent than Implied Threat Level One
.subj e c t s . It was suggested that this finding may be a manifestation of
reactance in the form of de~ogation of a threatening agent.
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The second experiment, designed as a partial replication of Sen-
senig and Brehm's (1968) experiment, replaced their positive-influence
control with a no-treatment control. The data did not support their
notion of a differential attitude change away from a threatening com-
munication, but were not totally inconsistent with reactance theory.
l~ereas threat to one behavioural freedom elicited a reliable conformity
response, implication of threat to future such freedoms was observed
to diminish the conformity response to the point where it could not
be separated from test-retest variability.
Both experiments were observed to support Grabitz-Gniech's (1971)
findings concerning central tendency effects. In both experiments,
no-treatment control subjects showed some degree of attitude change
away from the opinion they had earlier advocated. This finding empha-
sizes the need for careful consideration of the reactance phenomenon in
the design of appropriate controls for future experiments.
iii
Acknowledgements
I am especially grateful to my thesis supervisor, Ted Hannah,
for his perseverance in the reviewing of countless drafts of innumerable
thesis proposals, and also for his clear thinking, comments, and quick
"turn-around time" during the writing of the final version of the thesis.
I am also indebted to the members of my thesis committee, Malcolm Grant
and Bow Revusky, for their patience and guidance throughout all phases
of the research project. I wish also to thank Gertrude Gosse, a very
able confederate/key-puncher, without whose help I would not have been
able to complete the project in the time required.
Thanks are also due to a number of others: to Graham Skanes, for
his encouragement, and advice concerning aspects of data analysis; to
Dick Taylor, for a sympathetic ear, an outside perspective, and for the
use of his typewriter; to Jack Strawbridge for two years' use of his
computor account that made the stay at Memorial more enjoyable. Thanks
are also extended to Arnold and Gwen Campbell, Barbara Wattie and Don
Freeman for comments, ideas and general respite from experimentation.
Last, but in no case least, I wish to acknowledge a special debt to
my par~nts for moral support, and for their confidence in my abilities.
iv
Table of Contents
Abs t r ac t ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Acknowledgements. iii
List of Tables.................................................. v
The Phenomenon of Psychological Reactance....................... 1
Consequences of Reactance....................................... 2
Determinants of Reactance....................................... 5
Statement of the Problem........................................ "I I
Method. . . • . • . . • . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . • . • . . • . . • • • • . . . • . • . • . . . . . . • . • . . . 14
Results and Discussion.......................................... 22
A Partial Replication ••..
Summary and Conclusions.
31
37
References. . . • . . . . . • . . • • . • • . • . • . . . • • . . . . . • • . . • • . . • . • . • • • . . • • . . • . 39
Appendix A.. . . . . . . . . • • • . • • . • . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . • . • • . . . • . • • . . . • . • . .• "4 1
Appendix B. • . • . . . • • • . • . • . . . • . • • • . . • • • . . • • • • . . • . . . . . • . . • • • • . . . . . • 42
Appendix C...................................................... 43
vList of Tables
Table Page
1 Mean Estimates of Likelihood of Future Solicitations
of Opinion by Confederate (Experiment I} ••••••••••••••••• 23
2 Analysis of Variance of Subjects' Estimates of Like-
lihood of Future S-olicitations of Opinion (Experiment 1). 24
3 Means and Standard Deviations of Reactance and Cen-
tral Tendency }fuasures (Experiment 1) •••.•...••••••••.••• 26
4 Analysis of Variance of Reactance Measure:
Comparison with Central Tendency Control (Experiment 1) •• 27
5 Reactance and Central Tendency Measures in Experimental
and Control Conditions (Experiment 2) •••••••.•••••••••.•• 33
6 Analysis of Variance of Reactance Measure: Comparison
with Central Tendency Control (Experiment 2) •.••.••.••••. 35
The Phenomenon of Psychological Reactance
A voter attends a political rally before a big election. He hears
the party's platform presented and the party faithful loudly extolling
its virtues while carefully glossing over its pitfalls. The voter
begins to find the platform somewhat less attractive than he did before
the rally, and he leaves early.
A man who normally smokes either of two brands of cigarettes, Brand
A or Brand B, enters a store and discovers that it stocks only Brand A.
Rather than purchasing the readily available brand, he chooses to go to
another store, where he knows the other brand is available.
A child cautioned by his parents not to play in the street, does
so repeatedly until he is forcibly removed from the situation.
According to a recent theory by Brehm (1966) the three seemingly
different behaviours of the voter, the prospective customer, and the
child, have a foundation in a common motivation. All three persons have
suffered a loss, or a threat to a behavioural freedom. The voter hears
the platform praised, while its associated faults go unchallenged. It
is clear that its proponents are not interested in presenting both sides
and the voter is being denied the opportunity to weigh all the evidence
and make a meaningful decision for or against it. He restores his lost
freedom indirectly, by some degree of attitude change in the direction
away from that advocated in the platform.
The smoker, in all probability, considers himself free to purchase
either of the two brands of cigarettes. He finds his freedom to choose
eliminated by the store inventory. He restores his freedom by purchasing
2the eliminated brand at another store.
The child experiences loss of freedom in the prohibitions of his
parents. He restores his freedom directly by engaging in the proscribed
behaviour.
In his discussion of the effects of elimination of freedom, Brehm
writes
It is reasonable to assume ••• that if a person's
behavioral freedom is reduced or threatened with
reduction, he will become motivationally aroused.
This arousal would presumably be directed against
any further loss of freedom and it would also be
directed toward the re-estab1ishment of whatever
freedoms had already been lost or threatened.
(1966, p. 2)
This motivational force which tends to act as a counterforce to
threat Brehm calls "psychological reactance".
The arousal of reactance is not necessarily contingent on the
conscious elimination of one's freedom by a social agent. Fortuitous
events which may conspire to eliminate or threaten behavioural freedoms
are also hypothesized as constituting a sufficient condition for the
generation of reactance.
Consequences of Reactance
According to Brehm, the arousal of reactance may have a number of
possible consequences. It may manifest itself in direct attempts to re-
establish the lost, or to protect the threatened, freedoms. This effect
has been demonstrated in an experiment reported by Weiner (1963). In
this experiment, subjects (school children) were asked to rank-order
a set of toys on the basis of attractiveness. Subjects were told they
3would be allowed to choose whichever toy they wanted to keep. All sub-
jects returned a week later in order to rank the toys a second time.
Before ranking, however, the experimenter informed the subject that
another child had said (of the subject) that "he has to choose the
(subject's most preferred toy). He can't choose any other."
On reranking, the toy named by the experimenter showed a significant
decrease in attractiveness. Nontreatment control subjects did not show
this response. The results are consonant with the expectations of re-
actance theory.
Reactance may also result in the increased attractiveness of the
lost or threatened alternative. This has been demonstrated in two ex-
periments by Hammock and Brehm (1966). In their first experiment, sub-
jects rank-ordered nine different candy bars in terms of their liking
for each one. Experimental subjects were told they would later be allowed
to choose one of the candy bars in the next room. The subjects were led
into a second room where their third- and fourth-ranked bars were dis-
played. There, an assistant arbitrarily gave each subject his third-
ranked bar, despite the fact that experimental subjects had been promised
a choice. When subjects were asked to rerank the nine different bars
"because the experimenter had made a mistake in recording the subject's
pr ef er ences , " the forced choice bar was found to decrease in attractive-
ness, and the eliminated bar was observed to show an increase. Cpntrol
subjects who were not expecting to be able to choose did not show this
pattern of results.
4The second experiment by Hammock and Brehm (1966) was largely
a replication of the first, with minor changes in subjects, materials
and procedure. Subjects (middle class children) were asked to rank-
order a set of toys, valued at about a dollar each. In this experiment,
subjects were forced to take the toy they had ranked as third most
attractive; the fourth-ranked toy was eliminated. The same pattern of
results as the previous experiment was observed. Experimental subjects
tended to devalue the forced choice, and revalue the eliminated choice
alternative upward.
Where the threat takes the form of some kind of persuasive message,
reactance may appear as an attitude change in the direction opposite to
that advocated in the threatening message. A variation on this theme
has been presented by Jones and Brehm (197~. In this experiment, subjects
received either a one-sided or a two-sided communication which was repre-
sented to them as being a law student's final summary of a court case
that he would present were he the prosecuting attorney.
Before they were allowed to read the summary, subjects who were to
be made aware of the existence of both sides of the issue were informed
by the experimenter that the case was not an open and shut one, and that
the person writing the summary had had access to all the facts of the
case. Subjects were then asked to indicate how innocent or guilty they
felt the defendant to be. The data showed that the relative persuasive-
ness of the one-sided communication was lessened by the awareness of the
existence of two sides to the issue. It appears that when a person's
freedom to weigh all evidence is threatened by a communication which
5fails to adequately present all the facts, the result is a tendency on
the part of the recipient of the communication to change his opinion in
the direction opposite to the communication.
Determinants of Reactance
Brehm (1966, 1972) has attempted to delineate some of the variables
that influence onset and magnitude of reactance. He argues that reactance
is a function of the proportion of freedoms eliminated (1966, p. 29),
the importance of the eliminated freedoms (1966, p. 55), and also the
number of freedoms eliminated or threatened with elimination (1972, p. 2).
Brehm (1966) describes an experiment by Brehm, Mcquown and Shaban
which demonstrated the relationship between proportion of threatened
freedoms and magnitude of psychological reactance. Subjects in this
experiment rank-ordered a set of six movies, based on written descriptions,
on the basis of their desire to see each one. When the experimenter re-
turned a few days later, subjects were given a list of movie titles and
were told it would be possible for them to choose one of the movies from
the list to see. The list for half of the subjects contained all six
movie titles, while the remainder of the subjects received a list which
contained only the subject's three most preferred movies. Subsequently,
the experimenter informed each subject, individually, that the movie he
had ranked as second, had failed to arrive, and so it would be impossible
for him to choose that movie to see. Subjects were then asked to rerank
all six movies. The data showed that subjects in the three-movie con-
dition (where one-third of their choice alternatives were eliminated)
6increased their ranking of the eliminated movie more frequently than
did subjects in the six-movie condition. This tendency was not observed
in control subjects, who were not led to expect a choice.
Reactance is also hypothesized to be a function of the importance
of the freedoms eliminated. An experiment by Burton (1962) tested this
relationship. Subjects in a high importance condition were informed
that they would be able to choose one of two tasks to perform, and that
which task they chose, was indicative of certain aspects of their per-
sonality, since the tasks were taken from a well-known personality inven-
tory. Low Importance subjects were told that the experiment was just a
pilot study, and that all that was required of them was the performance
of one of the two tasks from which they were to choose. Subsequently,
a confederate who also appeared to be a subject, attempted to unduly
influence the subject's choice of tasks, saying, "I think we should
both do task A (or B)." The dependent variable was the frequency with
wh i ch subjects chose the task opposite to the one suggested by the con-
federate. The results tended to support the experimental hypothesis.
High Importance subjects showed a somewhat greater tendency to choose
the opposite task than those in the Low Importance condition.
Psychol~gical reactance, according to Brehm, is also a direct func-
tion of the number of threatened or eliminated freedoms. However, an
experiment by Brehm and Sensenig (1966) failed to find any support what-
soever for such a conclusion. In their experiment, subjects were told
they would be making a series of choices about which of two tasks to
perform, both for themselves, and for an unseen other. The experimenter
7informed the subject that, because many people felt a need for more
information in order to select the right task for the other person, that
other person had been allowed to consider each task beforehand, and write
a note to express his preference on each pair of tasks. It was empha-
sized , however, that the final judgement about each pair of tasks was
the responsibility of the subject. The procedure was then a matter of
looking at each of the tasks, considering the note from the other subject,
and making the decision.
Subjects assigned to the Control condition received a note from the
other subject in which simple preference for one or the other of the tasks
was expressed. High Implication subjects received a note for each of
the five pairs of tasks, which clearly indicated intent to usurp the right
of the subject to make the choice (eg., "I think we should both do task
I-A"). Low Implication subjects received only one such note about the
first pair of tasks and were informed that no further notes would follow.
The dependent variable was the tendency to choose the task opposite
to that suggested in the note accompanying the first pair of tasks.
It was observed that High Implication subjects showed more rejec-
tion of the influence attempt than did the Control subjects. Low
Implication produced only slightly more rejection than did the Control.
There was no difference between High and Low Implication. While the
results did not support the proposition that reactance is a function of
the number of threatened freedoms, there was general support for the
proposition that attempted usurpation of choice tends to produce rejec-
8tion of the influence attempt.
Sensenig and Brehm (1968) argued that the absence of the expected
effect of number of threatened freedoms in their earlier experiment
(Brehm and Sensenig, 1966) might conceivably be explained in the subjects'
perceptions of the threatening communication. It is possible that the
receiver might view the originator as transgressing the rules of the
experiment.
Thus, if the note is unexpected, and seemingly not
in keeping with the experimental instructions, the
subject may attempt to cover up for the other per-
son's transgressions by simply ignoring the note
as much as possible (Sensenig and Brehm, 1968, p.
329).
In their second experiment (Sensenig and Brehm, 1968) a situation
was devised in which it would be impossible for subjects to interpret
the threatening communication as a transgression of the experimental
rules.
Subjects participated in the experiment in pairs. They first com-
pleted a short questionnaire on a number of current issues. After the
subjects had completed the questionnaire, the experimenter explained
that he was interested in why people felt the way they did on some of
these issues, and that the remainder of the study would require that
they write a short essay on five of the fifteen issues.
In both the High Implied Threat and Control conditions, it was
explained that the experimenter was also interested in "comparing the
essays that are written by the two people who are in the study together",
and that they would be required to write from the same point of view on
9each of the five essays. Low Implied Threat subjects were told they
would only be required to write fram the same point of view on the
first essay, and that on the four later essays, they would be able to
defend the side they preferred.
It was explained to the two subjects that one of the two would be
designated as the one who would make the choice as to which side of the
issues they would support. In order to make the subjects feel that they
had at least some freedom on the issue, they were told that some of
the previous subjects who had been appointed to make the choices had
wanted to know what the feelings of the other person were, with respect
to the issue at hand. Because of this, it was explained, subjects
doing the choosing would be able to ask the other subject about her
preference. And in any case, it was emphasized, the person making the
choice would have the final say as to what side of each issue was to be
supported.
In a "rigged" drawing to determine who was to make the decision,
both subjects were designated as being the person who would be told
which side to support. Subjects were then led to separate rooms to begin
their respective tasks.
Subjects were given a list of five items taken from the questionnaire
the first of which was to be the crucial attitude measure. The parti-
cular item chosen was one on which pretest subjects had tended not to
show extreme opinions, and so attitude change in either direction was
possible.
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Subjects were then given a bogus note that instructed them to
write their essays in support of the side of the issue they had favoured
on the pretest. Control subjects received a note from the "other person"
wh i ch read, "I'd prefer to agree/disagree with this if it's alright with
you . " I-1igh Implication (of threat, in that these subj ects were led to
expect four more such interaction situations with the other person) and
Low Implication subjects received a note which read, "I've decided that
we will both agree/disagree with this." In the authors' own words , "It
can be seen that on ••• (the notes to subjects in all three conditions)
••• the other person stated a definite preference, but with the note
given in the Control condition, the person appeared to allow the sub-
ject the freedom of disagreeing with her if the subject wished" (Sen-
senig and Brehm, 1968, p. 326).
Subjects were given an essay form at the top of which was a scale
on which t.hey were asked to indicate their "true feelings on this issue".
They completed this scale and were allowed to write about five minutes
worth of material on the first essay. The experimenter then returned
with a form containing manipulation checks, and subjects were asked to
complete this "before we go on to the next essay." After subjects had
completed this form, the experiment was terminated.
The dependent variable was the degree of attitude change in the
direction away from that advocated in the communication. Change in this
direction was interpreted as reactance.
The results indicated that High Implication subjects showed greater
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reactance than did either Control or Low Implication subjects. Low
Implication subjects, however, failed to show any greater reactance
than the Control subjects.
The authors concluded
••• that the present experiment has supported the
various links in our chain of reasoning: that (a)
when a person's freedom is threatened, there will
occur a motivational state directed toward restora-
tion of the threatened freedom, (b) the greater the
number of behavioral freedoms threatened by impli-
cation, the greater will be the motivational state
and consequent tendency to restore the threatened
freedom••• (Sensenig and Brehm, 1968, p. 330).
Statement of the Problem
The final conclusion of the Sensenig and Brehm (1968) paper is
somewhat misleading as a summary of their findings. Sensenig and
Brehm (1968) have overinterpreted their data. They conclude that
threat to one behavioural freedom is a sufficient condition for the
arousal of reactance, and further, that the greater the number of
behavioural freedoms threatened, the greater will be the resultant
reactance effect. While it is true that the implication of threat to
five behavioural freedoms aroused greater reactance than threat to only
one such freedom, the latter was observed to produce no effects that
were discernible from those of a non-reactance control condition.
Recent data presented by Grabitz-Gniech (1971) also suggests that
the positive influence control group in the Sensenig and Brehm (1968)
exp~riment may have been an inappropriate control.
She writes
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In some studies ••• a central tendency (regression)
effect has been found. The values of the second
attractiveness judgement .••were moved to the centre
of the distribution, so that the distribution of
mean attractivness scores ••• exhibited smaller dis-
persion for the second judgement •
••• Reactance theory predicts an increased attrac-
tiveness of Object X3 in the second judgement as a
consequence of eliminating that object. However
the same positive shift of X3 occurs as a consequence
of a regression to the mean. The reactance effect,
caused by a social influence manipulation, could
not be separated, then, from an effect caused by
regression to the mean. The best way to control the
effect due to regression is to compare the data,
that is, changes in rating of.X3, of the elimination
conditions, with those of a no-treatment condition
that qualifies as an unbiased base line (Grabitz-
Gniech; "1971"', p. 190).
According to Sensenig and Brehm (19 68), threat to a behavioural
freedom should result in a tendency to reject the influence attempt,
and a consequent tendency toward attitude change away from the communi-
cation. Grabitz-Gniech's (1971) findings suggest that the criterion
for defining an attitude change away from an advocated position as
reactance should not be a comparison with a positive influence control
group. Rather, the criterion should be attitude change away from the
advocated position that exceeds that which would occur normally as a
function of test-retest variability or regression toward the mean.
Two experiments to test the effect of number of threatened freedoms
on psychological reactance have produced largely contradictory results.
Brehm and Sensenig (1966) found no support for the reactance theory
predicitions, while a small degree of support was to be found in the
Sensenig and Brehm (1968) experiment, although reactance in that ex-
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periment may have been confounded with central tendency effects.
The current experiment, then, was designed to examine the effects
of three levels of implied threats to behavioural freedom, as well as
the interactive effects of overt threats to freedom in the form of vari-
ations on certain aspects of communication style. In addition, a no-
treatment control condition was included to provide a baseline for cen-
tral tendency effects.
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Method
Overview
One hundred and ninety male and female undergraduate students
completed a questionnaire in which their attitudes were assessed on
a number of current Canadian issues. One hundred of these subjects
returned to participate in a second experiment in which they were led
to believe they would write short essays on five topics, which were
taken from the original questionnaire. These subjects were randomly
assigned without regard to sex, to either a Control condition (no
treatment) or to one of the cells of a 3 by 3 factorial design. The
factors varied were Implied Threat (the number of issues on which a
second subject, in fact a confederate, would determine which side of
the issue both of them would support in their essays) and Overt Threat
(the degree of usurpation, by the confederate, of the subject's right
to participate in the decision process). Subjects then completed an
attitude scale for the first issue, identical to that on the pretest.
Subjects
Subjects were 190 male and female undergraduate students enrolled
at Memorial University. These subjects were recruited by posters to
take part in a questionnaire session for which they were paid $1.00.
For one of five reasons, 59 subjects were excluded from partici-
pation in the second part of the experiment. Twenty-five subjects in-
dicated extreme positions on the critical item of the questionnaire.
Twenty-one subjects failed to indicate telephone number, thus precluding
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future contact, and seven more subjects refused to participate when
contacted. Five subjects failed to fully complete the first question-
naire. One more subject was eliminated when she recognized the girl
with her in the experiment as being the same one who had been with
her friend the previous day.
One hundred of the remaining 141 subjects returned for the second
part of the experiment. These subj ects were randomly assigned 'tJithout
regard to sex to either the control condition or to one of the nine ex-
perimental groups. Ten subjects were assigned to each condition.
:M:ater ials
A fifteen item questionnaire entitled "CANADIAN ISSUES QUESTIONNAIRE"
was used to assess subj ects' attitudes on a number: of issues of parti-
cular interest to Canadians.
Each subject returning for the second part of the experiment was
given a form on which five "essay topics", actually a ttitude statements
taken from the earlier questionnaire, were reproduced . These subjects
were also provided with an essay form for the first issue on which they
were asked to ~ite their essay. This form contained scales at the top
on which subjects were asked to indicate their own feeling on the issue.
Procedure
Subjects first completed the Canadian Issues Questionnaire during
a general group testing session. The questionnaire contained 15 items
and is presented in Appendix A. The first part of each item was an at-
titude statement accompanied by a 31-point Likert-type scale on which
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subjects were asked to indicate the extent of their .agr eemen t or dis-
agreement with that statement. This scale was anchored by "Strongly
Disagree" (I} and "Strongly Agree" (31). A second part of each ques-
tion asked subjects to assess the importance of the issue to them.
Again, a 31-point Likert-type scale was provided. This was anchored by
"Not at all Important" (1) and "Extremely Important" (31). Finally, a
third part of each item asked subjects to indicate on another 31-point
scale, their confidence in the opinion they had just expressed. Anchor-
points were "Not at all Confident" (1) and "Extremely Confident" (31).
Approximately one week after the initial questionnaire session,
subjects were contacted by telephone, and asked to participate in a
short experiment. Upon their arrival at the experiment, subjects en-
countered a female undergraduate, in actual fact a confederate, who was
also waiting to take part in the experiment. The confederate was usually
seated outside the experimental room with a purse and books, a posture
typical of female students waiting for an experiment.
In a small number of cases, it was impossible for the confederate
to be present when the subject arrived. In such cases, the subject was
invited into the experimental room. Approximately 3 to 5 minutes later,
the confederate knocked on the door, asking, "Is there supposed to be
an experiment here?"
Normally, though, only when both subject and confederate were pre-
sent were they invited into the experimental room. The experimenter
then introduced himself as a social psycholo~y student studying some of
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the issues that affect Canadians.
The experimenter continued:
I am very much interested in discovering why people
feel the way they do, on some of these issues. So,
today I am going to ask you to do a little thinking
and a little writing, on each of the five issues
that you see on this form.
The experimenter then gave both subject and confederate a form on
which five of the attitude statements from the Canadian Issues Ques-
tionnaire were printed. An example is presented in Appendix B. The
first of these five, "The unification of the Canadian Armed Forces
can only have harmful effects on the morale of each component" (item
15 in the questionnaire) was chosen because pre-test subjects had ten-
ded not to make extreme responses. The four remaining topics dealt
with subjects' attitudes toward a guaranteed annual income, the enforce-
ment of bilingualism in Canada, curtailment of Canadian energy exports,
and government enforced price controls (questionnaire items 7, 8,9, and
12, respectively). These last four items were generally of high im-
portance to pretest subjects, and were chosen to enhance the effective-
ness of the implied threat manipulation.
The experimenter continued with instructions composed from the de-
scription provided by Sensenig and Brehm (1968):
In addition, I am interested in making some
specific comparisons between the essays of the
two people who are in the experiment, together.
So, on the first (or the first three, or all
five.~ depending on the level of Implied Threat
to which the subject had been assigned) of these
issues, I am going to ask you both to write your
essay(s) from the same point of view. ie. You
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may both agree, or disagree, but it must be the
same point of view.
Now this means that, somewhere along the line,
someone has to make a decision: "How are we both
going to write?" The only way I could think of to
find that person, was to have a small lottery.
The experimenter then produced two slips of paper, and asked one
of the two to draw one, saying, "It doesn't matter whom. You have a
50--50 chance, either way." The confederate always offered to allow
the subject to make the draw. Only a small number of subjects declined
the offer.
In actual fact, the drawing was rigged, and both s~ips of paper
designated "the other ·per s on" as the one to make the decision. Thus,
if the subject made the draw, the message was clear. If the confederate
made the draw, she interpreted the message, saying "It says I'm supposed
to make the decision." The experimenter confirmed this fact.
The experimenter then addressed the confederate directly:
Okay, Trudy (confederate), you're going to be
making a (or a few, where appropriate) decision(s)
about which side of the first (or the first three,
or all five) issue(s) you and ••• (Subject's name)
will support, and you ••• (Subject) must support the
side that is decided upon.
Now, Trudy, a number of people who have been in
your position, in the experiment, making decisions,
have asked to know the other person's position on
the issue before making the decision. Now, you'll
be able to communicate with ••• (Subject) by note.
I'll explain that: I'm going to move one of you
into another room, to give you space to work. As
I was saying, you'll be able to communicate with •••
by note, and ask his/her opinion if you choose.
Now, I want to emphasize, you're not obliged to do
this; responsibility for the final decision is your
own.
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Do either of you have any questions?
The experimenter then answered any questions, and finally, para-
phrased the instructions, saying:
Trudy, you'll be making a decision on the first
(the first three, or all five) issue(s) about
which side of the issue you and ••• (Subject)
will support. You'll be free to ask his/her
opinion if you choose•••• (Subject) you'll be
free to support whatever side you choose on
the remaining issues.
Having satisfied himself that no questions remained unanswered,
the experimenter instructed the confederate to "come with me to the room
across the hall." The subject was told to read the issues over, and
that the experimenter would return in a few minutes with the first com-
munication.
Approximately three minutes later, the experimenter returned with
a message for the subject. Subjects assigned to the High Overt Threat
condition received a note which read "I have decided that we will both
agree/disagree on the first issue." Low Overt Threat subjects received
a note from the confederate which read, "I would prefer to agree/dis-
agree on the first issue, if it's alright with you." The communications
to both High and Low Overt Threat subjects always directed the subject
to write his essay in support of the same point of view he had expressed
on the pretest.
The confederate's communication to No Overt Threat subjects read,
"I have no fpre erence on the first issue. You make the decision." Sub-
jects made their decision, and the experimenter communicated this to the
confederate, who always approved the decision.
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When appropriate (in Implied Threat levels Three and Five) the
experimenter reminded the subject of the number of such communications
he was to expect from the confederate.
Control subjects were told nothing of any comparisons between the
essays of the two people, nor of any decisions to be made by one of
the two "subj ects". They were told only that they were to write essays
on each of the five topics, and that one of them would be moved into
another room to give them room to work.
All subjects were instructed to write their essays on a form pro-
vided for this purpose. At the top of this form was a duplicate of the
attitude statement as it had appeared on the pretest. On the scales
provided, the subject was asked to indicate his true opinion on this
issue.
Subjects were allowed five minutes to write their essay, at which
time, the experimenter returned with a form, which subjects were asked
to complete "before we go on to the next issue." This form, described
to subjects as a "check on the impressions you may have formed of the
other person who was in the experiment with you," was used to check
the manipulations of Implied and Overt Threat.
On the appropriate 31-point Likert-type scales, subjects were asked
to estimate their liking for the other person, the other person's compe-
tence on such tasks, the likelihood that the other person had affected
their opinion, and the likelihood that the other person would ask their
opinion on future issues. A copy of this questionnaire is presented in
21
Appendix C.
After completion of this form, subj ects were paid, and dismissed.
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Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check
The manipulations of Implied and Overt Thre~t were designed to
generate, in subjects, differential expectations of the likelihood of
the confederate's future solicitations of their opinion. In order to
assess the effectiveness of these two manipulations, subjects' estimates
of the likelihood of future solicitation, obtained from the post-ex-
perimental questionnaire, were subjected to a 3 (Implied Threat) by 3
(Overt Threat) factorial analysis of variance. The observed data to
be discussed are presented in Table 1. The complete summary table of
the analysis of variance of these data is given in Table 2.
A reliable main effect of Implied Threat was observed (F 21.609,
df = 2, 81, p < .001). Pairwise comparisons between cell means by the
Newman-Keuls statistic (Kirk, 1968, p. 91) showed Level One subjects
to have a significantly lower expectation of solicitation than those of
Level Three (difference = 9.16, W = 4.304; p < .01) or Level Five
r
(difference = 9.36, W = 4.894; p < .01). It appears then, that the
r
manipulation of Implied Threat was successful, ' i n that Level One subjects
were led to expect no interaction with the confederate on issues beyond
the first and their statements of expectation in this regard were con-
sonant with the intent of the manipulation.
A reliable main effect of Overt Threat was also observed (F = 6.337,
df = 2, 81; p < .003). A Newman Keuls-test showed High Overt Threat
subjects to have significantly lower expectations of solicitation than
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Table 1
Mean Estimates of Likelihood
of Future Solicitations of Opinion
by Confederate
(Experiment I)
Implied Threat
High Overt
Threat
Low Overt
Threat
No Overt
Threat
X=
SD =
x =
SD =
X
SD =
1
6.00
2.45
7.90
3.90
6.70
3.83
3
x = 12.20
SD = 6.09
x = 15.80
SD = 8.15
x = 20.10
SD = 6.94
5
x = 11.60
SD = 7.71
x = 16.90
SD = 8.12
x = 20.20
SD = 6.71
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Table 2
Analysis of Variance of Suojects' Estimates
of Likelihood of Future
Solicitations of Opinion
(Experiment 1)
SOURCE SS DF MS F
**Implied Threat (I) 1718.Q16 2 859.0-08 21.609
*Overt Threat (0) 503.821 2 251.910 6.337
I x 0 203.976 4 50.944 1.283
Within Cells 3220.000 81 39.753
Total 5465.813 89
,,* p < .001
* p < .01
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either Low Overt Thr~at (difference = 3.6, W
r
~ 3 24; P < .05) or
No Overt Threat suojects (difference = 5.734, W
r
= 4.894; P < .01).
The remaining pairwise comparison between Low and No Overt Threat did
not reach statistical significance.
Attitude Change
The principal dependent variable was the degree of attitude change
from first to second testing, in the direction opposite to that advo-
cated in the message from the confederate. Change in this direction
was given a positive sign to indicate a reactance effect. In the Con-
trol condition, the central tendency effect from first to second testing
was calculated, and was given a positive sign to make it comparable to
any reactance effects in the experimental conditions. Table 3 presents
the calculated reactance and central tendency effects for each condition.
The attitude change scores were analysed using a 3 (Implied Threat)
by 3 (Overt Threat) factorial analysis of variance with a single control
group (Winer, 1971, p. 468). This analysis revealed no significant main
effects of either Implied or Overt Threat (F = .39, df = 2, 90; p < 1,
for both effects). The Implied Threat by Overt Threat interaction also
failed statistical significance (F = .14, df = 4, 90; p < 1). The com-
plete summary table for this analysis is presented in Table 4.
Dunnett's test (Winer, 1971, p. 470) was used to compare each ex-
perimental cell-mean with that of the Control. No cell~mean differed
significantly fr9m the Control by this procedure.
Predictions based on Reactance theory, and data presented by Sen-
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations
of Reactance
and Central Tendency Measures*
(Exper iment 1)
Implied Threat
High Overt
Threat
Low Overt
Threat
No Overt
Threat
1
x = 2.0
SD = 5.2
X =-0.9
SD = 5.58
x = 1.0
SD = 4.02
3
x = 1.6
SD = 9.87
x = 1.7
SD = 8.44
X 3.9
SD = 7.35
5
x = 1.5
SD = 9.07
· X = 0.2
SD = 8.40
X 1.3
SD = 9.46
Control Group (Central Tendency)
x =.3.7
SD = 5.24
* A positive score indicates reactance, a negative score, conformity.
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Table 4
Analysis of Variance of Reactance Measure:
Comparison with Central Tendency Control
(Experiment 1)
SOURCE 88 DF MS F
Between Cells 185.400 9
Control vs All
Others 49.000 1 49.000 .770
Overt Threat (0) 50.066 2 25.033 .390
Implied Threat (I) 49.400 2 24.700 .390
I x 36.930 4 9.233 .140
Within Cells 5666.600 90 62.960
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senig and Brehm .C1968), would lead one to expect that, to the extent
that subjects perceived the confederate's mess,age as indicating poten-
tial threat to their right to participate in the decisions, that mes-
sage should arouse reactance. This reactance should take the form of
differential rejection of the influence attempt and a consequent at-
titude change away from the position advocated in the message. In
this respect, High Overt Threat subjects should have shown greater at-
titudinal reactance than either Low or No Threat subjects.
The data quite clearly did not support this expectation. A moder-
ate degree of attitude change away from the position advocated in the
communication was observed in all three Overt Threat conditions, but
the Overt Threat manipulation did not discriminate between the various
magnitudes of attitude change.
A further prediction from the work of Sensenig and Brehm (1968) was
that, to the extent that there may exist future occasions on which one's
freedom to participate in the decision-making process might be usurped,
there should be observed differential arousal of reactance, in the form
of attitude change away from the threatening communication. In the con-
text of the current experiment, it was anticipated that subjects in
Implied Threat Level One would show the least reactance since the pos-
sibility of further usurpations of freedom did not exist. However, this
expectation was not supported in the obtained data.
Lastly, it was expected that if no unitary effects of Implied Threat
were to be observed across the three Overt Threat levels, then Implied
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Threat effects should at least be observed in High Overt Threat sub-
jects, where usurpation of decision ~ights had already occurred, and,
in various degrees, was probable on future issues. The data clearly
did not support such an interaction hypothesis.
The observation of either of two significant main effects or the
interaction of the two would have provided a measure of support for
reactance theory predictions concerning the effects of implied threats
to behavioural freedom. The observed data in the principal analysis
are largely contraindicative of reactance theory expectations and the
findings of Sensenig and Brehm (1968) in that no effect of Implied
Threat was observed. The data are further contraindicative of reac-
tance theory expectations in that no calculated reactance effect was
observed to differ reliably from the central tendency effect observed
in the Control condition.
Post Hoc Analyses
In a secondary analysis of the data, Sex of the subject was in-
cluded in the general model, and its interactions with Implied and Overt
Threat assessed. This analysis revealed a significant Sex by Overt
Threat interaction (F = 3.625, df = 2, 72; p < .032). Pairwise compari-
sons by Tukey's HSD test (Kirk, 1968, p. 88) showed High Overt Threat
Male subjects to change their opinion away from the communication to a
greater extent than High Overt Threat Female subjects (difference
7.49, HSD = 7.21; p < .05). This sex difference, however, could not be
related to differential perceptions of the likelihood of future solici-
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tations of opinion, lik~ng for the confederate, nor to the subjects'
assessment of the competence of the confederate.
A second post hoc comparison revealed that High Overt Threat Males
showed more reactance than Low Overt Threat Males (difference = 6.0625,
HSD = 5.998; p < .05). In this case, it was possible to relate the
finding to subjects' perception of the likelihood of the confederate's
future solicitation of their opinion. Tukey's HSD .pr ocedur e showed Low
Overt Threat Males to perceive a somewhat greater likelihood of future
solicitation of opinion than High Overt Threat Males (difference
5.348, HSD = 5.25; p < .05). This finding, although post hoc is consis-
tent with the expectations of reactance theory.
In a further analysis, subjects' assessments of the confederate's
competence were analysed by a 3 (Implied Threat) by 3 (Overt Threat)
factorial analysis of variance. This analysis yielded a significant
effect of Implied Threat. Post hoc comparisons by means of the HSD test
showed Implied Threat Level One subjects to regard the confederate as
more aompetent than did those subjects of Implied Threat Level Five.
(difference = 3.867, HSD = 3.445; p < .05). This finding of a relation-
ship between Implied Threat and competence was unanticipated 3 but it may
well be that the decreased rating of the confederate's competence in Im-
plied Threat Level Five is a manifestation of reactance unrelated to at-
titude change measured on a questionnaire. It is possible that rather
than showing reactance through attitude change, Implied Threat Level Five
subjects may have derogated the threatening agent as an outlet for reac-
tance.
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The data from this experiment, then, provide only a s~ggestion of
the expected relationship between threats to behavioural freedom and
reactance in the form of attitude change. Contrary to expectations, no
overall Implied Threat or Overt Threat effects were observed in terms
of negative attitude change. Only in post hoc analyses were theoretical
expectations confirmed. Further post hoc analysis revealed the interes-
ting possibility that experienced reactance may manifest itself in the
derogation of a potentially threatening source.
The current experiment did t however, demonstrate the generality
of Grabitz-Gniech's (1971) notion of central tendency effects. As ex-
pected, no-treatment Control subjects showed some degree of attitude
change away from the position they had adopted in the first testing
session. This demonstration of a central tendency effect contraindicates
to a certain extent, the Sensenig and Brehm (1968) findings concerning
the effects of Implied Threat since they did not employ a no-manipulation
control. It is now questionnable whether their data would have supported
their expectation of attitude change away from a threatening communication
had they employed Grabitz-Gniech's no-treatment control rather than their
own positive-influence control.
A Partial Replication
It is possible that the delay between taking the Canadian Issues
Questionnaire and .participating in the experiment, approximately one
week, accounts for the difference in results between Sensenig and Brehm
(1968) and the current study. Therefore, a second, partial replication
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was carried out in which subjects' completed the Canadian Issues
Questionnaire, and participated in the essay writing in the same ses-
sion, as was done by Sensenig and Brehm (1968).
Two experimental treatments and the no-manipulation control were
employed, with 8 subjects assigned to each treatment group. Experi-
mental subjects were assigned to Levels One and Five of Implied Threat,
and subjects in both of these conditions received the High Overt
Threat message from the confederate.
The success of the Implied Threat manipulation demanded that sub-
jects in the two experimental conditions form differential expectations
of the likelihood of future social influence attempts. The post-experi-
mental manipulation check of subjects' estimates of the likelihood of
future influence attempts was analysed by independent ~-test. While
this test showed that no differential expectation had been aroused, a
Mann-Whitney Q (Siegel, 1956) performed on the same data showed Level
One subjects to have a significantly lower expectation of solicitation
than Level Five subjects (~= 15, p < .041). The results of this
analysis suggest that the manipulation was successful.
Reactance in the two experimental conditions and the central ten-
dency effect in the Control conditions were scored as in the main experi-
ment. The mean reactance and central -tendency effects are shown in
Table 5. These data were analysed using a one factor analysis of variance
with a control group (Winer, 1971, p. 203). This analysis revealed no
overall Implied Threat effects that were distinguishable from the test-
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Table 5
Reactance and Central Tendency Measures
In Experimental and Control Conditions*
(Experiment 2}
Control
Implied Threat
Level 1
Implied Threat
Level 5
x ;::: 0.125
SD = 1.36
X
SD
-3.375
4.99
X
SD
-0.375
6.16
* A positive score indicates reactance, a negative score, conformity
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retest variability of the Control condition CF = 1 448, df = 2, 21;
P > OS}. The summary table for this analysis of variance is presen-
ted in Table 6.
Dunnett's test (Winer, 1971, p . 201) was used to compare each of
the treatment means with that of the Control. This procedure showed
a reliable difference between Implied Threat Level One subjects and
the Control, in the direction of conformity responses for subjects in
the former condition (t = 2.358, p < .05). The mean of the Implied
Threat Level Five condition was not reliably different from the mean
of the Control group by this test.
Analysis of the results of the post-experimental questionnaire
showed that this pattern of results could not be attributed to differen-
tial perception of the confederate's competence, nor to the subject
liking for the confederate.
In contrast to the findings of Sensenig and Brehm (1968) who re-
ported reliable attitude change away from the advocated position in the
case of Implied Threat Level Five subjects, and an attenuated reactance
effect for Level One subjects, this second experiment produced no evidence
of any attitude change away from the advocated position. Rather, the
results indicated strong conformity in Level One subjects, and attenuated
conformity for those subjects in Level Five.
To some extent, however, this pattern of results may not be totally
inconsistent with the expectations of reactance theory. Subjects con-
formed to a social influence manipulation, but the threat of future such
influence attempts was observed to diminish the magnitude of the confor-
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Table 6
Analysis of Variance of Reactance Measure:
Comparison with Central Tendency Control
(Experiment 2)
SOURCE
Implied Threat
Within Cells
Total
SS
57.36
520.625
577.985
DF
2
21
23
MS
26.68
24.79
F
1.15
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mity response to the point where it could not be discriminated from the
no-influence control.
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Summary and Conclusions
One ~in experiEent and a partial replication were carried out
to examine the effects of implied threats to behavioural freedams on
psychological reactance.
The first experiment assessed the interactive effects of implied
and overt threat over a one-week delay. The observed data did not
directly support ~he Sensenig and Brehm (1968) finding that implied
threat to future freedoms is a sufficient condition for the arousal
of reactance in the form of attitude change away from a threatening
communication. The obtained data did not differ reliably from a no-
influence control condition.
Post-hoc comparisons were somewhat more supportive of reactance
theory. Sex of the subject was found to interact reliably with Overt
Threat. When pairwise comparisons were carried out, it was found that
High Overt Threat Males manifested greater reactance than females re-
ceiving the corresponding threatening message. A second comparison
showed that High Overt Threat Males tended to show greater reactance
than their Low Overt Threat counterparts. Although the former obser-
vation could not be attributed to differential expectations of future
solicitations of opinion, the data suggest that this factor may very
well account for the latter observation. High Overt Threat Males
reported significantly lower expectations of future solicitations than
did Low Overt Threat Males. This correlation is supportive of reactance
theory expectations.
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An unexpected find~ng was that implied threat resulted in differen-
tial perceptions of the competence of the confederate. Level One sub-
jects reported reliably higher ratings of competence than did Level Five
subjects. This finding is suggestive of a form of reactance totally
unanticipated, i.e., derogation of the source of threat. Further re-
search is needed, however, to validate this finding as a true reactance
effect.
The second experiment was designed as a partial replication of the
Sensenig and Brehm (1968) experiment, in a slightly altered form, where
a no-treatment control condition replaced their positive-influence con-
trol. This experiment provided no support for the Sensenig and Brehm
(1968) finding of attitude change away from the advocated position.
Change toward this position was observed in both levels of Implied Threat,
although this tendency in Level Five was less than in Level One. Still,
a small measure of support for reactance theory may be found in this ob-
servation. Whereas threat to one behavioural freedom elicited a st ong
conformity response, the implication of threat to future freedoms was
sufficient to attenuate this conformity to the extent that it could not
be distinguished from test-retest variability.
Experiments one and two are consistent in one further respect.
Both of these studies illustrate the generality of Grabitz-Gniech's
(1971) notion of central tendency effects. This finding emphasizes the
need for careful consideration of the reactance phenomenon in the design
of appropriate controls for future experiments.
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Appendix A
Canadian Issues Questionnaire
c-1ucl1 of the surve work exa . InLng attitudes of Ca adian on
current iss es has een carr·ed out ·n 0 tario, Quebec, and British
Columbia. Outlying areas (the rairies a d the rn ritirne provi ces)
h ve lar ely been ignored.
The pu ose of this questionn ere s to examine the attit de of
ewfoundland tude ts to yard issues of interest to Canadi.ans in genera
(althoug.. one or two uestions de 1 Tith Je.vfoundland, i p rticular).
T e uest·onn ire cons-sts of f-fteen uestio s; each question
is d·vided into tree parts.
The first part of each question is a statement about some cspect
of some controversi 1 issue. lov this state ent ·s a scale divided
by 31 obI-que I-nes (e J • I I I). At t e ends of this scale are two
reference oints rked: 1 (Strongly isagree) , and 31 (Strongl
Agree). Your vt ob is to indicate to wha t extent you a ree or disagree
wit} th-s statement. You can do this by placing a c eck-mark over
the oblique line that corresponds to your opinion. ou may check
any oblique et~een the one and the th-rty-one.
e. If you stron ly agree ·th a iven statement, you would
place a check-mark over the thirty-one obli ue. If you agree only
mildly you would lace a check ar~ so ewhere bet lee the centre of
the scale (16) and the thirty-one ohlique.
A second part to each question ~·ll ask ou how i ortant th·s
issue is to you. The scale is -dent-cal to the one escribed above,
but the end- oints re 1 ( ot at all I ortant) and 31 (Extre ely
1m ortant) . ~ in you may use any ortion of t' e scale.
A third oart of each question asks ho confident you are of the
o in·on you expressed in t e first part. If you are unsure of the
opinion, you ~vould lace a check mark some here between the centre
(16) and one ( ot at all Confident). ain you ay u e an part of
the scale.
OTE : On some scales, 31 is on t e rig t, and 0 others, it is on the
left. PLE E . V oJ v CAREFUL our T ICH E D OF THE SCAL f YOU RE
C ECKI G.
You are asked to please read each uestion carefully, exa ine
the associated scale, and check the appropriate res onse.
Please anSler each nart to each question•. nd, please lace
only one check-mark on a given scale.
ajor _
Thank JOu for yo r p rt·ci ation in this stud.
Please print Tour name Phone Tumber
---------------- ------
FacuLty -,__
Date and Place of birth
-_._-,"----'------------------
1. overn.ent employees should e denied the ri ht to strike.
/ I I / I / I / /--1--1 I I I / / I I I / / / I I I / I I / / /
31
tron~ly
agree
Ho~ important is the issue to you?
1
Strongly
disagree
I I I I I I I J I I I I I I I I I I I J I I I I J I I I I J II I I } I I I / I J j I I I , I I j , J I I I 1 I J I , J I I
1 31
I ot at all Extre ely
important im ortant
-ow confi ent are you of you opinio this iss e?0
I I I J I I J I I J J I J I 1-1-+· I I J I I I J I J I I I J IJ J I I I J I I I , I I , I J I J I , j I f I I I I I
1 31
Jot at all Extremely
confident conf ede t
2. Legal penalties for the use of marLj uana should e removed.
I I I I I J I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I J I I I I
I J I I , I I I f I I I , I I I I J , I , J J , I I I I I I I
1 31
Stronaly Strongly
disa ree agree
TO-tv 1m ortant is this ssue to you?
I I I J I 1+-1 I I I I I I I I ! I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I I j I , I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I , } , I
1 31
Jot at all Extremely
important important
Ho confide t are you 0 your opinion on this issue?
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I J I J I J J J I J I J I I I II I I I I , I I I I I I I I I J I I I I I I I I I I , J I I
1 31
~- ot at all Extremel
confident confident
3. Canada should take a strong stand i avour of the extensio of
territorial ate s to 20 miles.
I I I I I I I I I I I I J J I I I I J I I I I J J I I J I I II I j , I , I I I I I I I I , I I , I I , I I I J I } I J I J
1 31
Strongly Strongly
disa ree agree
How im ortant is this issue to you?
I J I I I I J I I I I I I I I I I J I
.-
J I I I / I I I I I I I
I I I I , I I , I I I I I I I I I I I I J I j I I 1 I I I I I
31 1
Extre el ~ ot at all
important important
1-10' confident are you of your 0 inion on this issue?
J I I I I / I I I / I I I I J I I I I I I / I / I I I I I I I
I J I I I I , I , I I J I J I I I J I I I I I , I J I I j , I
31 1
Extr emeLy l.iot at all
confident confident
4. The recent provincial :)overnment increases in ales tax and p ovincial
income tax should e reversed.
I I I I I I I J I I J I I I I I I 1+ I I J I I I I I I I I II I I J J I I I J I I I I I J I J I I I , J I I I I 1 I I
31 1
Stron 1y Strongly
agree disagree
ow confident are you of our opi on on t is issue?
I I J I I I I I I I f ·--f I I J I J I I J I I J I I J I I I I II I I I j I I I I I I , I J I , I J , , J J I , I I I I I
1 31
ot at all Extremely
confident confident
How ortant is this issue to you?
I J J I I I I I I J I I I I I I J I I I I J I I I I I I I I I
-, I J I I I I I j I I I I J I J I j J I I J j I I 1 J I I I I
1 31
ot at all Extre _ely
i ortant important
5. Positive action 0 the part of the federal government is desira Ie to
ste growing foreig investment in Canada.
I I I I J I I I I J I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
I J I J J , , I I I , I J I I I I J , I { I I , j I J j j j I
1 31
tron 1y ~tro 1y
disagree agree
How confi nt are you of your opinion on this ·ssue?
I J I I I I I I I I I I I I I I J J I J J J I I I J I I I I II I I I I J I I I I I J I I I I , I I I } I I J J } J I I I I
31 1
Extremel at at al
confident confident
How i ortant is this issue to you?
I I I I I J J I I J I J I I I I I I l I I I I J I I I I I I I
I I I I I j , , J J I I I j I I I I I I j , I I I I I I , I I
31 1
Ex t r e ne1 r ot at all
i ortant important
6. Off-s are mi era! depos·ts s 0 Id elo
....
to the COll try as a Thole, and
not 0 1 t.o the province off vho e shores they ie.
J I / J J I I
-r+ I J I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I I I , I I J I 1 , I I I , I I I , I I I , I I J J I I
1 31
~tron y St 0 ly
disa ree a ree
How confident are you of our 0 inion on t is S8 e?
J I J I I J I I I I J I I I I I I I I I I I J I J I I I I I JI I I I , I , I I I I / I I I I I I I I J J I I I j , I I ,
31
170t at 11 Ext r eme l
confident confident
ROJ i orta.t is this ssue to a ?
I J I 1-++-1 J J J I I I I I I I I I I I I J I I I I I I I fI I I I I I , I I I I I } I I I I I I I J J J I J I
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Appendix B
Essay Topics
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Appendix C
Post-experimental Manipulation Checks
YOUR PERCEPTIONS OF THE OTHER PERSON WHO IS IN THE EXPERIMENT WITH YOU
Your name
1. How competent do you feel the other person is on tasks such as you
are doing?
l / / / I I I / I I / I / I / I / / / / / / / I / I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I J I I J I J J J I I J J I J I J J J J J I J I I
31 1
Extremely Not at all
competent competent
2. How much do you like the other person?
/ / / / / / / I I I I I / "/ / . / / / / / / / / / / / / / I I / I I II I I I J I I I J J J I J I ] J I I } I I I I J J I I I J J J I J
1 31
Not at all A great deal
3. How likely do you think it is ·t ha t the other person affected your
opinion?
I I I I / I I I I / I / / / I I I I I / I / I I I / I / I I I I I II I J J I J I I I J J I I I } J I I J J J ] J J J J J I J I J I J
1 31
Not at all Extremely
likely likely
4. How likely do you think it is that the other person will ask your
opinion on later choices?
/ / / / /
31
Extremely
likely
/ / / / / / / I I / / / / I / / / 1// / / / / / I / / I
1
Not at all
likely




